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D avid Hume challenged rationalist epistemological theory, specifically the predominance of the “Principle of Sufficient Reason,” by asserting that it is impossible to truly know the causal connection be-
tween two events.  In doing so he posited the empiricist position 
that it is only through experience, not reason, that one can obtain 
knowledge of the world.  However, it remains a debate even to-
day whether Hume was questioning whether or not an event 
causes another, or if it merely follows it in regular succession, 
regardless of the event’s intelligibility to human consciousness.  
It is this difference in interpretation, between what has been la-
beled both positivism and skeptical realism that has emerged as 
a serious debate regarding Humean thought in the past twenty 
years.   
The positivist approach is rooted in Hume’s skepticism.  
It states that there is very little that we can understand regarding 
causality, outside of falling into regular patterns.  Recently the 
skeptical realists have rejected this idea, known as the “regularity 
theory,” replacing it with a notion of dependence between events 
that goes beyond regular succession.  However, a closer reading 
of Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding1 reveals 
the importance of subjective interpretation in his epistemology, 
an idea that fits in better with a third approach, that of anti-
realism as it is coined by Simon Blackburn.  I will review and cri-
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tique the main two approaches in the Enquiry, argue that Hume’s 
empiricism is metaphysically subjective and how that fits with 
anti-realism, and finally, discuss the ramifications of such on 
epistemology. 
Before embarking on a critical assessment of the two pri-
mary schools of thought on the issue, it behooves us to first 
closely examine what Hume said, and proceed from there.  To do 
so I will be focusing exclusively on the Enquiry, as Hume himself 
declared it to be an improvement over his Treatise.2  In section 7, 
“The Idea of Necessary Connexion,” Hume dismisses the ration-
alist principle of sufficient reason: 
 
“All events seem entirely loose and separate.  One event 
follows another; but we never can observe any tye be-
tween them.  They seem conjoined, but never connected.  
And as we can have no idea of any thing, which never 
appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment. The 
necessary connexion seems to be, that we have no idea of 
connexion or power at all. And that these words are abso-
lutely without meaning, when employed either in phi-
losophical reasonings, or common life… it is impossible 
for us, by any sagacity or penetration, to discover, or even 
conjecture, without experience, what event will result 
from it, or to carry our foresight beyond that object, 
which is immediately present to the memory and 
senses.”3 
 
Hume goes on to argue that the connection between 
cause and effect is but a feeling in the mind based on the custom 
or habit of observing similar events occurring in the same way 
over and over that gives us the idea of necessary connection.  
That is, the idea of causality is simply that, an idea, formed in the 
mind from the data of past experience, and not inherent in the 
event itself.  There are two important ramifications here.  The 
first of course is that every event does not have a cause that can 
be deduced a priori, consistent with Hume’s overall attack on ra-
tionalism.  The second, and perhaps more interesting, is the as-
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sertion that it is only after an idea of connection has been formed 
in the mind after the repeated witnessing of the same impression 
do we possess the idea of causality.  This is derived in part from 
Hume’s copy principle: “Every idea is copied from some preced-
ing impression or sentiment; and where we cannot find any im-
pression, we may be certain there is no idea.”4 Let me return to 
this idea of causality shortly. 
Hume concludes the chapter5 with his famous two defini-
tions of causality.  Hume admits that they are inconvenient in 
that the only definitions of cause that can be formed are from 
something foreign to it, yet he claims a more perfect definition 
cannot be attained. They are: 
 
1) “An object, followed by another, and where all objects, 
similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the 
second.  Or in other words, where, if the first object had 
not been, the second never had existed.  
2) An object followed by another, and whose appearance 
always conveys the thought to that other.”6 
 
There is some dispute as to what Hume meant with these 
definitions.  Hume states in the Treatise that the two are a 
‘philosophical’ definition and a ‘natural’ definition, in that or-
der.7  Thomas Richards determined that the first really is a defi-
nition, while the second is a statement of the conditions under 
which one believes in causality.8  J.A. Robinson is in agreement 
with the first part, but holds that the second is better regarded as 
a condition in which belief in causality in fact occurs as opposed 
to a more normative condition.9  Edward Craig considers both 
views and correctly argues that both definitions are descriptions 
of the circumstances that lead one to believe in causality.10  Craig 
realized that in Humean thought a definition is not the strict 
meaning of a term in the modern sense, as is argued by logical 
positivists, but rather a process of reducing ideas to the initial 
impressions the ideas were copied from, more description than 
definition.  In the case of defining causality, the two definitions 
reflect the two ways of experiencing causality, ideas copied from 
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the impression of necessary connection.  Craig, however, strug-
gled with the extensional equivalence of the two definitions, 
namely, “if one can be true when the other is not, how can they 
be called ‘views of the same object’?”11  This is an issue other 
modern philosophers have grappled with in interpreting Hume’s 
thought.12  Craig, despite the realization of causality as experi-
ence prima facie, is unsure whether the definitions are to be con-
sidered epistemologically or ontologically, in the form of “what a 
cause is.”13 I think for our purposes though, the realization that 
neither is a definition in the technical sense, but could perhaps be 
better described as descriptions, will suffice for now. 
Before we depart from Hume to focus on interpretation of 
his work, I would like to add one final note on Hume's idea of 
belief.  Justin Broackes has argued that Hume actually presents 
three kinds of conceptions of belief.14  I will follow Broackes’ line 
of reasoning in lieu of Hume’s discussion of belief in section 5 of 
the Enquiry and conclude that belief is “a steady and vivid con-
ception of an idea.”15  That is, it is a sentiment, dependent not on 
the will, more intense and steady than what the imagination 
alone is able to attain.16  This poses a philosophical problem for 
Hume, in that where do beliefs come from internally in his sepa-
ration of perceptions?  Belief for him is not an impression, nor is 
it an idea, as it goes beyond that in that it is a conception of an 
idea with a steady and vivid feeling attached, in other words, an 
idea that feels like an impression.  Externally he says their source 
is custom or habit formed from the constant conjunction of two 
events in a consistent causal relationship.  But custom does not 
carry with it necessarily steadiness and vivacity; instead it would 
be better characterized as an inference than a belief.  So what 
then is the shift from merely viewing such a conjunction to belief 
in its necessary occurrence, if all perceptions of the mind are ei-
ther ideas or impressions?17  Hume later argues that “this senti-
ment (of customary connection) is the original of that idea” (of 
causality), thereby stating that belief is an impression, which 
gives rise to our idea of causality vis-à-vis the copy principle.18  
But this contradicts his earlier statement that belief is a concep-
tion, more intense and steady than fictions, each of which he al-
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ludes are the product of the association of ideas.19  I believe the 
second is erroneous, as the first fits much neater with a temporal 
rise in belief, and the situation of belief as a “matter of fact” that 
stretches beyond our memory and senses.20   
There are now three concepts we are dealing with in in-
terpreting Hume’s theory of causality: his idea of it, the two 
“descriptions” of it, and the nature of our belief in it.   Our idea 
of causality stems from experiencing conjoined events, translated 
into two connected ideas through the copy principle.  This is en-
tirely accurate when viewing the mechanistic functioning of 
events.  When I push the pedals of a bicycle a series of chains and 
gears rotate the rear wheel forward.  However, Hume is not dis-
cussing the workings of a bike but rather human perception of 
the world, and our ability to organize and make sense of what 
we see.  That is why Hume says that although we are not logi-
cally justified to believe in causality, without it we would go 
mad.  Hume is more interested in explaining how we understand 
things to be, or believe things to be, as opposed to what reality is. 
The aforementioned definitions highlight this distinction 
further.  As was mentioned earlier they could be understood bet-
ter as descriptions than definitions.  Such an understanding re-
solves the difficulty in having two definitions of the same thing, 
especially if a no more perfect definition cannot be attained.  So 
what exactly do these definitions describe?  Immediately it be-
comes apparent that even though an observer is not mentioned, 
both seem to presuppose its existence.  The first definition de-
scribes objects similar to one another, a distinction that requires 
an outside observer in order to undertake the comparison; other-
wise you would merely have two different objects.  It takes a 
third being, the subject, to experience the two objects and deem 
them to be similar or dissimilar.  The second definition contains a 
thinker who associates one object with the thought of another.  
So although both discuss causality in lieu of a subject, the first 
focuses on the impression of causality while the second focuses 
on its idea, which is of course entirely consistent with the mind 
being divided into two classes of perceptions.  The definitions 
thus reflect the two ways our mind can perceive causality, as an 
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impression or as an idea, as opposed to two ways causality oc-
curs.   
What is interesting in the definitions is the unrestrained 
individual ability to determine what constitutes similarity, and 
what can be associated with an idea.  The source of each is the 
same, the experience we have interacting within the world.  
Hume is correct in that knowledge cannot be deduced a priori 
through reason alone, but what must be acknowledged, how-
ever, is the uniqueness of every individual’s experience.  At 
every moment our consciousness is bombarded not just with one 
experience, but many experiences simultaneously, as each of our 
senses detects multiple stimulations of various degrees.  For ex-
ample, as I type this I audibly detect not only the music I am 
playing, but the clacking of the keyboard reacting to my fingers, 
the sound of a TV playing in the background, the rumble of my 
stomach, and the whistling of the wind outside my window.  
Each of these adds an element by overall experience, a cumula-
tive activity that grows with each passing moment.  As a result, 
my cumulative experience is uniquely my own, so much so that 
if another person were to engage in the exact same activity as I 
am, say watching a sunset, it would be comprehended in two 
entirely different ways, as each of us would be bringing a differ-
ent memory of perception to the sunset experience.  A religious 
person may think immediately of the awesome power of God, 
and connect the sunset with other religious experiences, while a 
scientist would connect it to other ideas associated with plane-
tary rotation and a painter would begin mentally reconstructing 
the sunset in his mind so as to be able to reproduce it on canvas.  
So whereas we are sharing in the common experience of the sun-
set, and can relate that experience to one another through the 
common vehicle of language, our experiences are uniquely our 
own, a fact that would become apparent to us through utilizing 
language in describing our unique interpretation of a common 
experience. 
So too are our beliefs, which, as conceptions of ideas, are 
our ways of making sense of the world, as “matters of fact” be-
yond the present.  Being derived from the relation of cause and 
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effect, they are products of the two ways our mind perceives cau-
sality, and subjected to the same uniqueness of experience that 
constitutes each individual, in the way each sorts and orders ac-
quired ideas.  This explains how similarly constituted people in a 
similar situation can have radically different beliefs, their experi-
ence, unique to them, reveals stark differences in approach to a 
similar event.  For example, a husband and wife could each wit-
ness a different shooting death, one a senseless crime and the 
other an act of self defense, and could come away from their re-
spective experience with a different belief in guns, gun control, 
and public safety.  It is the human interpretation of the act, not 
the act itself, associated with other ideas (of gruesomeness, jus-
tice, etc) with the steady and vivid feeling attached of revulsion, 
relief, etc that forms our beliefs of the way the world is.  Again, I 
think it is important to consider that in a discussion on belief and 
knowledge of causality, we are considering a human element, 
not a mechanistic ordering of the universe more apt to be in-
cluded in a defense of rationalism.  Kant’s later explanation of 
the difference between noumena and phenomena makes this dis-
tinction clearer. 
 When I say “I” it must be acknowledged that it is a term 
of convenience.  In actuality, the self is at best a belief, created 
from our experiences to give us a basis of understanding the 
world.  Such a concept of self confirms our impression on 
uniqueness, in that my experience is mine alone, in its cumula-
tive totality completely different from anyone else’s.  Gilles 
Deleuze asserts the world as well is a term of convenience, a fic-
tion of the imagination.21  Hume regarded the self to be not as a 
separate and distinct substance, ala Cartesianism, but rather a 
collection of impressions and their corresponding associated 
ideas, known as a “bundle theory” of self.22  I bring this up to 
anticipate any objection to the idea of subjectivity through 
Hume’s disjointed notion of identity.  In fact, it is the lack of es-
sence to the self and the world that leaves individual subjectivity 
as the only method of making sense of anything, as a world that 
supplies knowledge without encroaching on my idea of myself 
as Self.  “The impressions of sensation only form the mind, giv-
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ing it merely an origin, whereas the impressions of reflection (the 
principles of association of ideas) constitute the subject in the 
mind, diversely qualifying the mind as subject.”23  Without indi-
vidual interpretation it would be impossible for the mind to ever 
organize its impressions to form a system that we believe to be 
the self.  In other words, even though the self does not exist as a 
separate and distinct substance, we believe in the idea of such, 
and such a belief is derived from the collection of impressions 
and ideas organized into a system I call “me.”  For example, I 
believe I exist, and that I am an intelligent, open-minded, hu-
manist.  Whether or not this is true is irrelevant, what is relevant 
is that I believe it, and that this belief stems from the bundle of 
ideas I have about myself that I have chosen to represent me, re-
gardless of how I actually react to the world. 
So how does this fit within the prevailing theories of 
Hume’s philosophy?  As I mentioned earlier, the primary ap-
proach to Hume until only recently was to consider him a posi-
tivist.  This viewpoint held that there is very little we can ever 
understand regarding the causal connection between events, 
other then the observation that events have a regular pattern to 
them.  This opinion, known as stated earlier as the “regularity 
theory” took its cue from the first definition of causality: ‘An ob-
ject, followed by another, and where all objects, similar to the 
first, are followed by objects similar to the second;’ and Hume’s 
earlier dismissal of necessary connection: 
 
“When we look about is toward external objects, and con-
sider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single 
instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion; any 
quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the 
one an infallible consequence of the other.”24 
 
Richards and Robinson were of the positivist view, evi-
dent by their reliance on strict truth in their view of the accuracy 
of the first definition of causality and agnosticism towards the 
second.   Among more recent philosophers Barry Stroud stands 
out as one as well.25  This was the dominant view until recently, 
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power, or ‘natural necessity’, or ‘Causation’,”26 regardless of our 
awareness of the “secret power”27 of connection.  This view, 
coined “skeptical realism” by Wright,28 holds that there is “some 
thick notion of dependence between events that goes beyond 
regular succession…even if it will be one about whose nature 
and extent we are doomed to ignorance.”29  They take seriously 
the numerous passages that allude to the existence of such a 
power.30  Strawson argues that Hume’s skepticism would not 
allow him to make a dubious ontological statement like “all that 
causation actually is, in the objects, is regular succession” which 
for Strawson “is enough to refute the standard 
view” (positivism).31  He goes on to correctly point out the im-
possibility of obtaining a perfect definition of causality “because 
of our ignorance of its nature”, for if causation were just regular 
succession there would be no imperfection.32  Smith perhaps 
phrases it better: 
 
“He (Hume) is not committed to a denial of the possibil-
ity or even actuality of real connexion, but only to the 
contention that as such it is beyond our powers of com-
prehension.”33 
 
Thus, the skeptical realists have refuted the positivist 
claim of regular succession.  But is this itself an accurate interpre-
tation of Humean thought?  Blackburn argues it is not.  Accord-
ing to him, skeptical realists would have to characterize Hume’s 
position on what he refers to as either the nexus or the strait 
jacket.34  The nexus is the idea that if αλφα were to occur, βετα 
would necessarily follow, in a dependent, causal relationship.  
But if this were so, then it must be part of the natural order, im-
mune from Hume’s critique of the uniformity of nature.  Black-
burn calls this desire a straitjacket on the possible course of na-
ture, and a ‘time-proof connexion’, thereby rigidly governing 
how things could ever fall out.35  The demands of such limita-
tions make it impossible to consider a realist approach in light of 
the importance of Hume’s skepticism. 
Blackburn’s solution is to introduce a third interpretation, 
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that Hume’s philosophy is a form of anti-realism, an underused 
concept that essentially means that there is no universal reality, 
only individual truths.  Unlike the skeptical realists, who claim 
there is such reality, in the form of necessary connection that re-
mains unknown to us (the skeptical side of the term), Blackburn 
maintains that not only can we not know causality, but the ex-
perience of such is individualized, which fits well with the argu-
ment of Hume’s epistemology being subjective.  Blackburn de-
fends this viewpoint by saying that:  
 
“upon experience of such a regular succession the mind 
changes… functionally: it becomes organized so that the im-
pression of the antecedent event gives rise to the idea of a 
subsequent event.  No new aspect of the world is revealed by 
this change: it is strictly non-representative, just like the onset 
of a passion, with which Hume frequently compares it.  But 
once it takes place we think of the events as thickly con-
nected; we become confident of the association, we talk of 
causation, and of course we act and plan in the light of that 
confidence.”36 
 
Such a shift in the organization of ideas can only be done 
on an individual basis, as I have already argued that experience, 
the source of the mind’s ideas, is always individually unique.  He 
goes on to apply this idea to the two definitions, arguing that the 
first describes the contribution of the world in so far as we can 
apprehend it (our impression of causality), and the second de-
scribes the functional difference in the mind that apprehends the 
regularity (our idea of causality), acknowledging that each repre-
sent different aspects of our awareness of causality and not to be 
viewed as strict definitions in the positivist sense.37 
What are the implications of such a shift in opinion in re-
gards to Hume’s epistemology?  His skepticism of universal 
truths combined with an individualized theory of knowledge 
aims at the heart of rationalism, and only in this form can it ulti-
mately be successful in addressing in a systematic way how one 
can know anything, as opposed to how everyone can know one 
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thing.  Of course, such freedom from limitation and openness to 
interpretation frightened some later philosophers, and prompted 
Kant’s defense of metaphysics and attempt at reconciling indi-
vidual existence with universal truth.  Hume’s philosophy 
stretches beyond Kant’s efforts, however, as it predates a post-
modernism it may very well have found a home in.  The similari-
ties between the two in regards to their dismissal of meta-
narratives and openings for a pluralist theory of truth is a topic 
that is begging to be explored further, in another work.  For our 
purposes it suffices to conclude by saying that Hume success-
fully introduced the subject into modern epistemology, an omis-
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